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1 Introduction
Models of optimal stopping capture the trade-off between known current payoffs and the
opportunity cost of future potentially superior possibilities. In most of their economic ap-
plications, the environment in which the stopping decisions are taken is assumed to be sta-
tionary. In the standard job search model, for example, a rejected offer is followed by an-
other draw from the same distribution of offers. See Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005)
for a survey. Similarly, in most models of research and development (R&D), current effort
is assumed to have the same probability of yielding a success regardless of the history. See
for example Grossman and Shapiro (1986); although also see Malueg and Tsutsui (1997)
for an exception to this, in a model of R&D competition.
The predictions of these models are at odds with empirical observations. Reservation
wages of unemployed workers decline in the duration of the unemployment spell; see
e.g., Lancaster and Chesher (1983). Prices of houses decline as a function of time on
the market; see e.g., Merlo and Ortalo-Magne (2004, p. 214). Research projects are
sometimes started and later abandoned.
We propose a simple model of optimal stopping where the economic environment
changes as a result of learning. From a methodological point of view, our main contri-
bution is the development of a framework that captures essential features of the learning
problem and yet is analytically tractable. Rather than using the deterministic model of
optimal stopping typically used in optimal job search models, we generalise the other
canonical model of stopping in economic theory, where stopping occurs probabilistically
(as in e.g., models of R&D). We cast the model in the language of job search, but in the
concluding section, we point out alternative interpretations for the model.
In the main model, a worker that is initially uncertain about her job prospects meets
potential employers randomly. She posts a reservation wage; potential employers arrive
according to a Poisson process and observe the posted offer. They offer employment if
and only if the worker’s productivity exceeds her wage demand. The worker is initially
uncertain about the probability of meeting a suitable employer, and the only information
that the worker receives is the hiring decision. The worker updates her beliefs about the
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distribution of her productivity in a Bayesian fashion, becoming more pessimistic about
her future opportunities in each period when she is not hired. The speed of decline of her
beliefs about future job opportunities depends on the current wage demand. At very high
demands, no employer is willing to hire the worker and hence little information is conveyed
by the fact that no job offers were received. At very low wages, all employers are happy
to employ the worker and hence the absence of a job offer is merely an indication that no
potential employers were present. At intermediate wages, some employers are willing to
employ the worker while others are not. If the distribution of a high productivity worker
dominates that of a low productivity worker, in an appropriate sense,1 then the absence
of a job offer is an indication that the worker is more likely to be of low productivity.
In summary, when setting her current wage offer, the worker controls the immediate
expected wages conditional on a firm offering employment, as well as the beliefs about
her own productivity if no job is offered.
Even though our model is a standard Bayesian learning model, the belief dynamics
may appear unfamiliar at first sight. Conditional on an accepted wage offer, the game
is over and continuation beliefs play no further role. When we describe the evolution of
beliefs over time, we are implicitly conditioning on the event that no job was offered in the
current period. Since this event is bad news about her future employment prospects, the
worker become more pessimistic over time. The worker can then control the (downward)
drift of her beliefs through her choice of reservation wage. In addition, the process of
beliefs is effectively deterministic, again because continuation beliefs play a role in only
one of two possible random outcomes. This is in contrast to many learning models where
the continuation beliefs are stochastic and form a martingale, and where the agent can
control only the variance of her beliefs.
When comparing the model with learning to the model with stationary wage offers,
two features change simultaneously. A more pessimistic future implies a lower current
value of being unemployed and hence a lower current reservation wage. We call this
feature the controlled stopping effect. In a model where perceived job opportunities
1We show that hazard rate dominance is the relevant relationship for our model.
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decline due to reasons unrelated to current wage demands (such as depreciation of skills),
the controlled stopping effect would be the only effect.
In our model, the current reservation wage also determines the magnitude of the
change in beliefs if the worker is not hired. By setting a more informative reservation
wage, the worker can cause her beliefs to fall further in the event of remaining unemployed.
A more pessimistic worker has a lower value from job search than a more optimistic
worker—there is a capital loss from learning. Holding fixed the probability of a receiving
a job offer, then, the worker has an incentive to move her reservation wage in the direction
that minimises this capital loss i.e., the change in beliefs if she is not hired. We call this
feature the controlled learning effect.
Which effect dominates? Does learning cause the worker to raise or lower her reser-
vation wage, relative to the case when no learning occurs? How does this comparison
depend on the level of beliefs (i.e., degree of optimism or pessimism) of the worker? Fi-
nally, does a more pessimistic worker always set a lower reservation wage; or do the two
effects lead to more complicated dynamics for the wage?
We distinguish between two different scenarios. In the first, there is no uncertainty
about the distribution of the workers’ productivities across the firms but the market con-
ditions (common to all workers) are unknown at the outset. We model this by introducing
uncertainty about the Poisson rate of contact between firms and workers; we call this sce-
nario the common uncertainty model. A high Poisson rate corresponds naturally to a job
market where the workers are in relatively high demand. In the idiosyncratic uncertainty
model, the rate of contact between workers and firm is known but there is heterogeneity
in the workers’ productivities. Any given worker may be of high or low productivity. We
assume that the productivity distribution (across firms) of a high productivity worker
dominates that of the low type worker, in terms of hazard rate dominance.
A key question for the analysis is whether these two effects work in opposite or the
same directions. The benchmark is a model where the rate of contact is fixed at its current
expected level. Since the value of continuing search decreases as the worker becomes more
pessimistic (in the model with learning), the controlled stopping effect on its own leads to
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lower optimal wage demands. In the common uncertainty model, a higher wage demand
always slows down learning, since the difference in the probability of finding a job in the
two states is monotonic (and in fact positively multiplicative) in the overall probability of
finding a job. We show that the controlled learning effect dominates in this case. Hence
the optimal wage demands in the common uncertainty model exceed the wage demands
in the equivalent model with no learning.
In the idiosyncratic uncertainty model, the controlled learning effect is not monotonic
in wage demands. If all employers are willing to hire at very low wage demands and no
employers hire at very high demands, it is clear that intermediate wage demands are the
most informative. As a result, the controlled learning effect pulls up wage demands of
optimistic workers (those with relatively high reservation wages) and pushes down the
demands of pessimistic ones. Since the controlled stopping effect always pushes wage
demands downwards, it is clear that the model with learning yields relatively low wage
demands for pessimistic workers, in comparison to the model with no learning. We also
derive sufficient conditions for the model to yield higher wage demands for optimistic
workers in the learning case. As a result, learning accelerates the decline in wage demands
as beliefs become more pessimistic.
This work is related to the literature on search with learning. Burdett and Vishwanath
(1988) analyse an optimal stopping problem when wage offers come from exogenous
sources. Crucially, in Burdett and Vishwanath (1988), learning is independent of the
current actions and hence the stopping problem is quite different from the one that we
propose to study. Furthermore, the analysis in Burdett and Vishwanath (1988) is compli-
cated by the fact that new wage offers lead to discrete jumps in the posterior belief whereas
in our model, the evolution of beliefs is smooth (see e.g., equation (1)). There is a small
number of papers on search in models where the state of the system changes exogenously.
Van den Berg (1990) and Smith (1999) are examples of such models. Anderson and Smith
(2006) analyse a matching model where each match results in a current immediate pay-
off and reveals new information about the productivity of the partners. In all of these
papers, beliefs change i.e., the environment is non-stationary; but the change in beliefs is
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not affected by the action chosen by the economic agent. Our contribution is to develop
a tractable framework that allows agents to affect their learning through their actions.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model of learning and search.
Section 3 analyses the model in the common uncertainty case; section 4 deals with the
case of idiosyncratic learning. Section 5 discusses alternative interpretations of the model
and concludes.
2 Labour Search and Learning
Consider an unemployed worker setting his reservation wage for entering employment.
The worker announces at the start of each period his reservation wage for that period.
If he receives a job offer with a wage that exceeds the reservation wage, then he accepts
that offer and stops searching. The probability that the worker receives such a job offer
depends on two factors: whether a vacancy arises during the period; and whether the
employer with a vacancy is willing to meet the worker’s reservation wage. The worker
does not observe whether a vacancy occurs: he observes only when a job offer is made.
Assume that employers know perfectly the productivity of the worker, which is specific to
each particular employer. Hence an employer will make an offer of exactly the reservation
wage if the worker’s productivity in that job exceeds the reservation wage; otherwise, no
offer is made. A vacancy lasts for one period, and then disappears. (This model also
matches a monopoly seller of a single unit facing an infinite horizon of buyers who each
live for only one period.) We assume that search is not directly costly. But by continuing
search, the worker delays receiving a wage; discounting then makes search costly.
Time is continuous, the worker is infinitely lived and discounts future at rate r. There
are two states of the world: ‘high’ (H) or ‘low’ (L). The worker is initially uncertain about
the state and her s problem is to post wage demands to optimise her expected lifetime
wage earnings. The problem can thus be cast as a continuous time discounted dynamic
program where the belief about the state of the world serves as the state variable.
The worker receives an offer during a time interval of length ∆t in state H when
5
posting a reservation wage w ∈ R+ with probability H(w)∆t; the probability in state L
is L(w)∆t. Both probabilities are decreasing in w (a higher reservation wage makes it
less likely that an offer is received). Let the corresponding densities be l(w) and h(w).
Assume that the distributions L(·) and H(·) can be ranked by hazard rate dominance:
Assumption 1 (Hazard rate dominance)
l(w)
1− L(w)
≥
h(w)
1−H(w)
∀ w ∈ R+.
Note that assumption 1 implies first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) i.e., ∆F (w) ≡
L(w)−H(w) ≥ 0.
The state variable in this problem is then the worker’s scalar belief pi ∈ [0, 1] that the
state of the world is high. When the worker receives a job offer (at the reservation wage),
the problem stops. Hence the only event that is relevant for updating the worker’s beliefs
is when no job offer has occurred in a period. Denote the posterior probability that the
distribution is H after a history that has included no job offers by pi. Along the optimal
path, offers must occur with strictly positive probability and hence pi must be strictly
decreasing, by FOSD. The updated posterior after no job offer is, by Bayes’ rule,
pi +∆pi =
pi(1−H(w))
pi(1−H(w)) + (1− pi)(1− L(w))
so that
∆pi = −pi(1− pi)∆G(w) ≤ 0
where ∆G(w) ≡ H(w) − L(w) ≥ 0. Notice that the worker becomes more pessimistic
about the state of the world when no job offer is received.
We now consider two different cases of the model. First, we suppose that the workers
are learning about the arrival rate of offers. Since it is natural to interpret this type
of uncertainty as arising from market conditions (such as the number of active firms)
affecting all workers in a similar manner, we call this common uncertainty. In the second
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model, there is uncertainty about the distribution of a worker’s productivity across firms.
It is natural to think of this case as learning about idiosyncratic productivity. Even
though we could nest the mathematical structure of the first model in the second, we find
it useful to analyse them separately. In addition to the differences in interpretation, the
analysis of the first model is much more transparent and hence serves as a good guide to
the more complicated arguments of the second model.
3 Common uncertainty
In this case, the states of the world are distinguished by the frequency of arrivals of
vacancies. In the low state L, the Poisson arrival rate is λL > 0. In the high state H, the
Poisson arrival rate is λH > λL. Employers’ wage offers are drawn from a distribution F (·)
with a density function f(w), so that, conditional on a vacancy arising, the probability
of the worker’s reservation wage w being met is 1− F (w). Hence H(w) = λH(1− F (w))
and L(w) = λL(1 − F (w)). Assume that 1 − F (w) − wf(w) is strictly decreasing in w,
so that the objective function in the static problem is concave and therefore the problem
has a unique solution.
Bayes’ rule gives the worker’s posterior, after a period when no job offer was received,
in the continuous-time limit (∆t→ 0) as
p˙i(w, pi) = −pi(1− pi)∆λ(1− F (w)) < 0 (1)
where ∆λ ≡ λH−λL > 0. Notice that a higher reservation wage is always less informative
in this case. By setting a high reservation wage, the worker decreases the rate at which
his posterior goes down, since p˙iw(w, pi) = pi(1− pi)∆λf(w) > 0.
The worker’s static problem,
max
w
{
λ(pi)(1− F (w))w
}
,
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has a unique solution wS given by the first-order condition
ΓS(wS, pi) ≡ δ(pi)(1− F (wS)− wSf(wS)) = 0
where δ(pi) ≡ r/λ(pi). (The δ(pi) factor appears to aid comparisons later.)
Consider next the benchmark intertemporal model where the worker faces the same
arrival rate λ(pi) in all periods. Since the problem remains the same in all periods, the
dynamic programming problem of the worker is particularly easy to solve. This solution
will serve as a natural point of comparison to the model that incorporates learning about
λ i.e., with pi changing over time. We refer to this case as the repeated problem.
For the stationary problem, the worker’s Bellman equation is simply:
VR(pi) = max
w
{
λ(pi)∆t(1− F (w))w +
1− λ(pi)∆t(1− F (w))
1 + r∆t
VR(pi)
}
.
In the continuous-time limit as ∆t→ 0, this becomes
δ(pi)VR(pi) = max
w
{
(1− F (w))(w − VR(pi))
}
.
The first-order condition for the repeated problem is
ΓR(wR, pi) ≡ ΓS(wR(pi), pi) + (1− F (wR(pi)))
2 = 0. (2)
Since (1−F (w)) is decreasing in w, there is a unique solution to equation (2). And since
(1 − F (w)) ≥ 0, wR(pi) ≥ wS, as expected. The value function of the repeated problem
is then
VR(pi) =
(1− F (wR(pi)))wR(pi)
1− F (wR(pi)) + δ(pi)
.
Consider next the model with learning. The crucial difference compared to the re-
peated problem is that now pi evolves over time according to equation (1). The worker
anticipates this and adjusts her optimal wage demand to control the current probability
of being hired and the future value of search.
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The worker’s Bellman equation is now:
VD(pi) = max
w
{
λ(pi)∆t(1− F (w))w +
1− λ(pi)∆t(1− F (w))
1 + r∆t
VD(pi +∆pi)
}
.
In the continuous-time limit as ∆t→ 0, this becomes
rVD(pi) = max
w
{
λ(pi)(1− F (w))(w − VD(pi))− pi(1− pi)∆λ(1− F (w))V
′
D
(pi)
}
.
It is easy to see that in this problem, V ′(pi) > 0 almost everywhere. Since the value
in any program is realized only at the stopping moment, the value of any fixed policy
must be increasing in the arrival rate and hence pi. Hence the optimal policy starting at
pi yields a higher value when started at state pi′ > pi and as a consequence V (pi′) > V (pi).
We shall show later (see lemma 2 in the appendix) that V (pi) is convex and as a result,
V (pi) is differentiable almost everywhere.
After standard manipulations, the Bellman equation can be rewritten as
VD(pi) = max
w
{
VR(w, pi)−
∆λ(1− F (w))
λ(pi)(1− F (w, pi)) + r
pi(1− pi)V ′D(pi)
}
. (3)
This latter equation makes clear the connection between the repeated and dynamic prob-
lem. The dynamic value function is equal to a repeated value function, VR(wD, pi) (eval-
uated at the optimal dynamic action, wD), minus a term that arises due to learning.
Note that −∆λ(1 − F (w))pi(1 − pi)V ′
D
(pi) is the capital change (a loss) of the agent’s
program resulting from the evolution of the agent’s posterior. The learning term is the
present value of the infinite stream of the capital losses due to learning, using the effective
discount rate λ(pi)(1− F (w)) + r.
It is useful to analyse the behaviour of the learning term more carefully. The factor
pi(1−pi)V ′(pi) in the capital loss term represents the impact of a unit of learning on future
payoffs. It is unaffected by the current choice of w and hence we ignore its impact for the
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moment. We thus concentrate on the behaviour of
−
∆λ(1− F (w))
λ(pi)(1− F (w, pi)) + r
as a function of w. Its derivative with respect to w has two terms. The first,
−
∆λ(1− F (w))λ(pi)f(w)
(λ(pi)(1− F (w, pi)) + r)2
,
measures the effect of w on the modified stopping rate. We call this effect the controlled
stopping effect. This effect captures the increasing pessimism of the worker and has always
a negative sign. This effect alone leads to lower wage demands for the worker.
The second term
∆λf(w)
λ(pi)(1− F (w, pi)) + r
,
measures the change in learning, normalised by the stopping rate resulting from a change
in w. We call this effect the controlled learning effect. In the current model, a higher w
leads to a smaller change in pi, through Bayes’ rule; as a result, this effect always directs
the worker towards higher wage demands to minimise the bad news conditional on not
being employed.
Because learning takes a particularly simple multiplicative form in this model, it is
possible to sign the overall effect of learning unambiguously. After cancelling terms in
the controlled stopping and learning effects, we can write the first-order condition for the
problem as:
ΓR(w, pi) + r∆λf(w)pi(1− pi)V
′
D(pi) = 0. (4)
Again, we observe that since ΓR(w, pi) is decreasing in w and r∆λf(w)pi(1−pi)V
′
D
(pi) > 0,
all solutions wD(pi) to the first-order condition (4) satisfy wD(pi) > wR(pi) for all pi. (Since
f ′(w) may be positive or negative, it is no longer possible to guarantee the uniqueness of
wD(pi).)
Hence the reservation wage set by the worker who learns about the state of the world is
above the reservation wage of the non-learning worker. As a result, the probability that the
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learning worker receives a job offer is below that of the non-learning; and this despite the
fact that the learning worker becomes more pessimistic over time about his employment
prospects. Pessimism on its own would cause the worker to set a lower reservation wage,
since the worker should be more willing to exit search and accept a job offer. But the
worker is able to slow down the rate at which he becomes more pessimistic by setting a
high reservation wage. This more than off-sets the fall in the worker’s posterior, ensuring
a higher reservation wage.
We summarise this discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the case of learning about the arrival rate of job offer arrivals, wS ≤
wR(pi) ≤ wD(pi) for all pi ∈ [0, 1].
In this case, it is also relatively straightforward to establish monotonicity of the reser-
vation wages in the posterior belief.
Proposition 2 wR(pi) and wD(pi) are non-decreasing in pi.
Proof. The first-order condition for wR(pi) can be written as
1− F (wR(pi))− f(wR(pi))(wR(pi)− VR(pi)) = 0.
The monotonicity of wR(pi) follows from the second-order condition, and the fact that the
derivative of this first-order condition with respect to pi is f(·)V ′
R
(pi), which is positive.
The first-order condition for wD(pi) is
λ(pi)(1− F (wD(pi))− f(wD(pi))(wD(pi)− VD(pi))) + f(wD(pi))∆λpi〈1− pi)V
′
D
(pi) = 0.
(5)
Using the second-order condition, wD(pi) is non-decreasing in pi iff
∆λ(1− F (wD(pi))− f(wD(pi))(wD(pi)− VD(pi)))
+ λf(wD(pi))V
′
D(pi) + f(wD(pi))∆λ
d
dpi
(pi〈1− pi)V ′D(pi))
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is non-negative. But this can be established, using the Envelope theorem on equation
(3), the first-order condition (5), and a few straightforward manipulations of the resulting
expressions. 
3.1 Two-point example
We can illustrate these results in a simple case where the worker’s productivity in a job
can take two values, v > v > 0, with probabilities β ∈ (0, 1) and 1 − β respectively. In
this case, we are able to provide explicit solutions for the worker’s value function and
reservation wage.
For the problem to be interesting, assume that βv < v, so that in the static problem,
the worker would set a wage equal to v. Also assume that if the worker knows that
λ = λH , its optimal reservation wage is v; but if the worker knows that λ = λL, its
optimal wage is v. That is, assume
βλHv
r + βλH
≥
λHv
r + λH
>
λLv
r + λL
≥
βλLv
r + βλL
.
By standard arguments, the (dynamic) worker’s reservation wage strategy then takes
a simple form: set the wage at v when the posterior is above some cut-off; and v for
posteriors below this level. Let the cut-off level of the posterior pi∗ ∈ (0, 1). For pi ≥ pi∗,
the worker’s value function is the solution to the ordinary differential equation (ODE)
pi(1− pi)∆λV ′(pi) +
(
r
β
+ λ(pi)
)
V (pi)− vλ(pi) = 0.
The general solution to this ODE is of the form
V (pi) = k1
(
1− pi
pi
) r+βλH
β∆λ
pi +
βλLv
r + βλL
+
rβ∆λv
(r + βλL)(r + βλH)
pi
for pi ≥ pi∗ > 0. The first term represents the option value from learning to the worker.
(k1 is a constant of integration that will be determined below.) It is a convex function of
pi.
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For pi < pi∗, the worker sets its reservation wage at v; its value function is then given
by the solution to a second ODE:
pi(1− pi)∆λV ′(pi) + (r + λ(pi))V (pi)− vλ(pi) = 0.
The general solution to this ODE is of the form
V (pi) = k2
(
1− pi
pi
) r+λH
∆λ
pi +
λLv
r + λL
+
r∆λv
(r + λL)(r + λH)
pi.
The first term represents the option value from learning to the worker. It is unbounded
as pi approaches zero; hence the constant of integration k2 must equal zero. In words, the
worker has no option value when pi ≤ pi∗. The reason is that there is no prospect of the
worker’s posterior increasing above pi∗; hence the worker’s reservation wage is constant
(equal to v) once the posterior falls below pi∗. There is then no option for the worker to
value. So, for pi < pi∗,
V (pi) =
λLv
r + λL
+
r∆λv
(r + λL)(r + λH)
pi.
There are two remaining parameters to determine: k1 and the optimal boundary pi
∗. Since
pi∗ is chosen optimally, value matching and smooth pasting apply; these two boundary
conditions are sufficient to determine k1 and pi
∗.
The worker’s value function in this case is illustrated in figure 1. It is a strictly convex
function of pi in the region pi ≥ pi∗; for pi < pi∗, it is a linear function. The two portions
value match and smooth paste at pi∗, given by
pi∗ =
(
− (v − βb¯)r2 + (β(v − v)λL − (v − βv)λH)r + β(v − v)λLλH
)
λL(
− (v − βv)r2 + β(v − v)(λL + λH)r + β(v − v)λLλH
)
∆λ
.
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Figure 1: The value function with a 2-point valuation distribution
Let λ0 be such that
βλ0v
r + βλ0
=
λ0v
r + λ0
, i.e., λ0 =
r(v − βv)
β(v − v)
.
For a worker who is certain of the arrival rate, the optimal reservation wage is v for all
λ ≥ λ0, and v for λ < λ0. Then define pi0 to be such that pi0λH + (1 − pi0)λL = λ0. If
pi∗ ≤ pi0, then uncertainty causes the worker to set a higher reservation wage in this case
with a two-point valuation distribution. Lengthy but straightforward calculation shows
that this inequality holds if
v
r + λH
<
βv
r + βλH
which was assumed at the outset. In summary: learning about an unknown arrival rate
causes the worker to set a higher reservation wage.
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4 Idiosyncratic uncertainty
In this second case, the states of the world are distinguished by the distributions from
which productivity levels of the workers are drawn (conditional on a vacancy arising). In
the high state of the world, productivities are drawn from the distribution FH(·); in the
low state, they are drawn from FL(·). We assume now that the corresponding densities
fH(w) and fL(w) are continuously differentiable. Let the union of the supports of the
distributions be [0, 1] (without loss of generality). Let ∆F (w) ≡ FL(w) − FH(w) > 0
denote the difference between the two distributions; and let ∆f(w) ≡ fL(w) − fH(w)
denote the difference between the densities. In both states of the world, vacancies occur
randomly according to a Poisson process with parameter λ (the same in both states).
We let pi denote the worker’s subjective posterior probability that the state is H.
Furthermore, we let the current expected distribution of productivities across firms be
denoted by
F (w, pi) ≡ piFH(w) + (1− pi)FL(w),
and define f(w, pi) similarly.
The worker’s updated posterior after no job offer is calculated similarly to the previous
section:
p˙i = −λpi(1− pi)∆F (w) < 0.
Notice that the worker again becomes more pessimistic about the state of the world when
no job offer is received.
We assume again that 1 − F (w, pi) − wf(w, pi) is strictly decreasing in w for any pi.
This ensures that the worker’s static problem,
max
w
{
λ(1− F (w, pi))w
}
,
has a unique solution wS given by the first-order condition
ΓS(wS, pi) ≡ δ(1− F (wS, pi)− wSf(wS, pi)) = 0.
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By direct analogy to the previous section, the worker’s Bellman equation (in the
continuous-time limit) for the repeated problem (i.e. the problem without learning about
pi) is
δVR(pi) = max
w
{
(1− F (w, pi))(w − VR(pi))
}
where δ ≡ r/λ. The first-order condition for the repeated problem is
ΓR(wR, pi) ≡ ΓS(wR, pi) + (1− F (wR(pi), pi))
2 = 0,
and the value function of the repeated problem is then
VR(pi) =
(1− F (wR(pi), pi))wR(pi)
1− F (wR(pi), pi) + δ
.
It will be helpful for subsequent arguments to establish the monotonicity of wR(pi) at
this stage of the analysis.
Proposition 3 wR(pi) is non-decreasing in pi for all pi ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. wR(pi) is non-decreasing in pi iff
∆F (wR(pi)) +
∆f(wR(pi))(1− F (wR(pi), pi))
f(wR(pi), pi)
+ f(wR(pi), pi)V
′
R(pi) ≥ 0. (6)
We know that V ′
R
(pi) ≥ 0; and f(wR(pi), pi) ≥ 0. Hence the last term in this expression is
non-negative. Hence condition (6) requires that
∆F (wR(pi)) +
∆f(wR(pi))(1− F (wR(pi), pi))
f(wR(pi), pi)
≥ 0.
Clearly it is sufficient that
∆F (w) +
∆f(w)(1− F (w, pi))
f(w, pi)
≥ 0 ∀ w ∈ R+ (7)
since the term ∆F (wR(pi), pi)(1 − F (wR(pi), pi))/(1 − F (wR(pi), pi) + δ) is positive (given
first-order stochastic dominance). But condition (7) is ensured by assumption 1. 
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The dynamic programming equation in the case with learning is (in the continuous-
time limit)
VD(pi) = max
w
{
VR(w, pi)−
∆F (w)
1− F (w, pi) + δ
pi(1− pi)V ′D(pi)
}
, (8)
where
VR(w, pi) ≡
(1− F (w, pi))w
1− F (w, pi) + δ
.
As in the case of learning about the arrival rate, the dynamic value function is equal to
a repeated value function, VR(·, ·), minus the present value of the infinite stream of the
capital losses due to learning:
∆F (w)
1− F (w, pi) + δ
pi(1− pi)V ′
D
(pi).
We ignore for the moment the issue of non-concavity of the maximand in equation (8)
(but we return to this below). The first-order condition for the dynamic problem is
ΓR(wD(pi), pi)− pi(1− pi)V
′
D
(pi)ΓˆD(wD(pi)) = 0 (9)
where
ΓˆD(w) ≡ f(w, pi)∆F (w) + (1− F (w, pi) + δ)∆f(w). (10)
Although it is not immediately obvious, ΓˆD(·) does not actually depend on pi, even though
the posterior appears on the right-hand side of equation (10). In fact, all terms in pi cancel
out in this expression.
The sign of ΓˆD tells us whether a higher reservation wage increases or decreases the
present value of the capital losses from learning. This present value is increasing in w
when ΓˆD is positive, and decreasing in w when ΓˆD is negative. As in the previous section,
this effect operates through two channels: controlled stopping (the term f(w, pi)∆F (w))
and controlled learning (the term (1−F (w, pi)+δ)∆f(w)). It is again easy to see that the
controlled stopping effect, on its own, leads to a lower reservation wage for the worker. In
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fact, this is a feature of all models where continuation beliefs are more pessimistic than
current ones and where the the action has a negative effect on the probability of stopping.
In the case of learning about common uncertainty, the controlled learning effect is
always positive: a higher reservation wage is always less informative, and hence always
decreases the learning capital loss. In the case of learning about idiosyncratic uncertainty,
if ΓˆD(w) had the same sign for all w, then the comparison of wD(pi) and wR(pi) would
be equally straightforward. But this is not the case. ΓˆD(0) = (δ + 1)∆f(0) must be
non-negative; and ΓˆD(1) = δ∆f(1) must be non-positive (both due to FOSD). Hence
ΓˆD(w) must cross zero from above at least once.
This non-monotonicity arises quite naturally in the model of learning about distribu-
tions. On an intuitive level, neither very high wage demands nor very low wage demands
are very informative about the type of distribution: the former are always rejected by
firms and the latter are always accepted.
In the rest of this section, we shall suppose that ΓˆD(w) has a single crossing point
i.e., that there is a unique wˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that ΓˆD(wˆ) = 0 and ΓˆD(w) > (<)0 for all
w < (>)wˆ. In other words, we assume that there is a unique reservation wage that
maximises the capital losses from learning. (Things are more complicated when ΓˆD(w)
has multiple crossing points. But the same arguments apply, so we concentrate on the
case of a single crossing point.) As an illustration, figure 2 plots ΓˆD(w) for the case
where FL(w) = 2w − w
2 and FH(w) = w
2, where w ∈ [0, 1]. For this example, ΓˆD(w) =
2(w2 + (1− 2w)(1 + δ)) and wˆ = 1 + δ −
√
δ(1 + δ).
Because ΓˆD(w) changes sign, we cannot guarantee that the maximand in equation (8)
is quasi-concave. The problem is that learning may be sufficiently important that the
worker optimally changes her reservation wage discontinuously as her posterior changes,
in order to control the progress of her beliefs. In other words, we cannot ensure in general
that the first-order derivative
ΓS(w, pi) + ΓR(w, pi)− pi(1− pi)V
′
D
(pi)ΓˆD(w)
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wΓˆD(w)
wˆ
Figure 2: ΓˆD(w) when FL(w) = 2w − w
2 and FH(w) = w
2 on [0, 1]
is single downward-crossing in w for any pi. The sum of the first two terms ΓS(w, pi) +
ΓR(w, pi) (the first-order derivative from the repeated problem) is single downward-crossing
in w. But since the slope of ΓˆD is ambiguous (and pi(1 − pi)V
′
D
(pi) ≥ 0), the overall
slope of ΓS(w, pi) + ΓR(w, pi)− pi(1− pi)V
′
D
(pi)ΓˆD(w) cannot be determined in general. If
pi(1−pi)V ′
D
(pi) is sufficiently large (i.e., learning is sufficiently important), then it may be
that single downward-crossing is violated.
The analytical hurdle is that we are unable to derive V ′
D
(pi) in general, and so are
unable to determine its size. Our approach is to derive the following bound on the
learning effect pi(1− pi)V ′
D
(pi).
Lemma 1 For any pi ∈ [0, 1],
pi(1− pi)V ′D(pi) ≤ B(pi) ≡ min
{
pi
(
1− F (wˆ, pi) + δ
1− FL(wˆ) + δ
)
(V (1)− VR(pi)), pi(1− pi)V (1)
}
where V (1) ≡ VR(1) = VD(1) is the (common) value function when pi = 1:
V (1) ≡ max
w
{
(1− FH(w))w
1− FH(w) + δ
}
.
The proof of the lemma is in the appendix. In order to interpret the first part of the
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bound B(pi), note that equation (8) implies that
VD(pi) ≥ VR(pi)−
∆F (wR(pi))pi(1− pi)V
′
D
(pi)
1− F (wR(pi), pi) + δ
≥ VR(pi)−
∆F (wˆ)pi(1− pi)V ′
D
(pi)
1− F (wˆ, pi) + δ
.
The first inequality comes from maximisation. The second inequality follows because
∆F (w)pi(1− pi)V ′
D
(pi)
1− F (w, pi) + δ
is maximised at wˆ. The first lower bound for VD(pi) is then the value from the repeated
problem, VR(pi), minus the maximised present value of the stream of the capital losses in
the dynamic problem. This lower bound on VD(pi), combined with convexity of the value
function, then gives the upper bound in the lemma on the effect of learning, measured by
pi(1− pi)V ′
D
(pi).
Next, we make the following assumption. For this assumption, define pˆi as follows. If
wˆ ∈ (w(0), w(1)), then pˆi is such that wR(pˆi) = wˆ. If wˆ ≤ w(0), then pˆi = 0; if wˆ ≥ w(1),
then pˆi = 1. (Here, w(1) ≡ wR(1) = wD(1) and w(0) ≡ wR(0) = wD(0).)
Assumption 2 1. If pi ≤ pˆi, then ΓR(w, pi)− B(pi)ΓˆD(w) ≤ 0 for all w ≥ wˆ.
2. If pi > pˆi, then ΓR(w, pi)−B(pi)ΓˆD(w) ≥ 0 for all w ≤ wˆ.
The economic content of this assumption is to ensure that learning cannot be ‘too
important’, by placing a limit on the upper bound of the learning effect. In order to
establish any clear results, we need a condition of the form
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂wVR(w, pi)
∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂w
(
∆F (w)
1− F (w, pi) + δ
pi(1− pi)V ′
D
(pi)
)∣∣∣∣.
In words, this requires that changing the reservation wage has a greater effect on the
value of the repeated problem than it does on the capital losses arising from learning.
But a condition like this has two weaknesses. First, it involves endogenous variables
that we cannot solve for: in particular, VD(pi). Hence we use the upper bound B(pi)
on pi(1 − pi)V ′
D
(pi) in assumption 2. Secondly, the condition is actually stronger than is
20
needed. In the proof of proposition 4, in fact all we need is for the condition to hold when
either pi is small and w large (i.e., pi ≤ pˆi and w ≥ wˆ), or vice versa. Nevertheless, the
general purpose of assumption 2 is to ensure that the value from the repeated problem
matters more than learning capital losses when setting the dynamic reservation wage.
Ideally, we would like to be able to relate assumption 2 directly to the primitives of
the model: δ and the distributions FH(·) and FL(·). Unfortunately, we have not found a
way of doing this. But at least it is easy to verify whether the assumption is satisfied.
For example, consider the set of distributions FL(w), FH(w) whose densities are linear
and symmetric:
fL(w) = t− 2(t− 1)w, fH(w) = 2− t+ 2(t− 1)w
for t ∈ [1, 2] and a ∈ [0, 1]. When t = 1, the distributions are both uniforms; when
t = 2, the distributions are those that we used above in e.g., figure 2. We have verified
numerically that assumption 2 is satisfied, for a large number of values of δ ≥ 0 and
t ∈ [1, 2].
Armed with the assumption, we are finally able to compare the repeated and dynamic
reservation wages.
Proposition 4 Suppose that assumption 2 holds. If pi ≤ (>)pˆi, then wD(pi) ≤ (>)wR(pi).
Proof. We provide the proof of the first part of the proposition (if pi ≤ pˆi, then wD(pi) ≤
wR(pi)). The proof of the second part is similar and so is omitted. Since wR(pi) is non-
decreasing in pi (from proposition 3), if pi ≤ pˆi, then wˆ ≥ wR(pi). By assumption 2,
ΓS(w, pi) + ΓR(w, pi) − G(pi)ΓˆD(w) ≤ 0 for all w ≥ wˆ. But, for w ≥ wˆ, ΓˆD ≤ 0, and so
ΓS(w, pi) + ΓR(w, pi)−G(pi)ΓˆD(w) ≥ ΓS(w, pi) + ΓR(w, pi)− pi(1− pi)V
′(pi)ΓˆD(w). Hence
ΓS(w, pi) + ΓR(w, pi) − pi(1 − pi)V
′(pi)ΓˆD(w) ≤ 0 for all w ≥ wˆ. Therefore wD(pi) < wˆ.
But for w < wˆ, ΓˆD ≥ 0, and so ΓS(w, pi) + ΓR(w, pi)− pi(1− pi)V
′(pi)ΓˆD(w) ≤ ΓS(w, pi) +
ΓR(w, pi). Hence wD(pi) ≤ wR(pi). 
Proposition 4 shows the difference between this application, in which ΓD can be of
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either sign, and the case of common uncertainty, where ΓD is negative. In the latter
case, the dynamic reservation wage is always greater than the repeated wage, whatever
the worker’s beliefs. This is because the controlled learning effect always dominates
the controlled stopping effect in this example; and controlled learning always calls for a
higher reservation wage. In this case of learning about idiosyncratic uncertainty, a higher
reservation wage can either increase or decrease the capital losses from learning. When a
higher wage decreases the capital loss—when ΓD is negative—the dynamic wage is above
the repeated. This occurs when the wage is relatively high: ΓˆD(w) is negative for w ≥ wˆ.
By proposition 5, this means for relatively high posteriors. On the other hand, when
a higher wage increases the capital loss, the dynamic wage is above the repeated. This
occurs when the posterior and the reservation wage relatively low.
This is illustrated in figure 3 (in which FH = w
2 and FL = 2w − w
2, and δ = 1)
which plots the difference between wD(pi) and wR(pi). It shows that wD(pi) is greater
than wR(pi) for pi greater than around 0.5. Note also that the absolute difference between
wD(pi) and wR(pi) is greater when pi is low. In this region, the controlled stopping and
controlled learning effects point in the same direction: both call for a lower reservation
wage. At higher values of pi , the two effects point in opposite directions (and the con-
trolled learning effect dominates). As a result, the difference between the dynamic and
repeated reservation wages is smaller.
Finally, figure 4 plots wD(pi), illustrating that it is monotonically increasing in the
posterior belief (for the same distributions). Unfortunately, we cannot establish this
result fully. Proposition 5 states what we are able to show.
Proposition 5 wD(pi) is non-decreasing in pi for pi ≤ pˆi.
Proof. Differentiation of the first-order condition (9), substitution of the Bellman equa-
tion (8), and use of the Envelope theorem shows that the sign of the derivative of wD(pi)
in pi is given by the sign of
(∆F (wD(pi)))
2 + ΓˆD(wD(pi))V
′
D
(pi).
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Figure 3: The difference between the repeated and dynamic reservation wages
From proposition 4, if pi ≤ pˆi, then wD(pi) ≤ wˆ. If wD(pi) ≤ wˆ, then ΓˆD(wD(pi)) ≥ 0. The
result follows. 
For pi less than pˆi, the controlled stopping and controlled learning effects point in the
same direction; and both induce monotonicity in the dynamic reservation wage. But when
pi is above pˆi, these two effects pull in opposite directions. Proposition 4 shows that we are
able to determine the balance in terms of the levels of reservation wages. It appears to be
much more difficult to resolve how the competing factors affect the slope of the dynamic
reservation wage. The learning effect can, potentially at least, be non-monotonic in the
posterior. We have yet to find a workable bound on the size of the rate of change of the
learning effect that will allow us to establish monotonicity for all values of pi. Numerical
analysis indicates that, for the set of distributions with densities
fL(w) = t− 2(t− 1)w, fH(w) = 2− t+ 2(t− 1)w
for t ∈ [1, 2] and w ∈ [0, 1], wD(pi) is monotonic in pi.
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Figure 4: The dynamic reservation wage wD(pi)
5 Conclusion
We have written the model in terms of a job search problem in order to see the effects
of learning within a concrete economic application. The model can easily be generalised
to accommodate some other standard economic models. By introducing a flow cost for
actions, it is possible to transform the model of learning about arrival rates into a model
of R&D where the true success probability is initially unknown. Furthermore, there is
no particularly compelling reason to concentrate only on Bayesian learning models. The
change in posteriors could equally well reflect accumulation of past accumulated actions.
Hence this model can be used as a basis for a non-Poisson model of R&D.2
The entire paper is written in terms of ever more pessimistic continuation beliefs.
Obviously we could have taken an application where continuation beliefs drift upwards
conditional on no stopping. As an example, consider the maintenance problem of a
machine whose durability is uncertain. (Or the problem of finding the optimal effort level
to demand from an agent or worker). As long as the machine does not break down, beliefs
about its longevity become more optimistic. Apart from the obvious change in signs, the
2A previous version of this paper includes such an application and is available from the authors upon
request.
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controlled stopping and learning effects are present in such models as well.
In this paper, we have analysed models of Poisson-type information revelation where
conditional on no stopping, the process of beliefs is deterministic. A useful extension
of the model could consider beliefs that are stochastic even conditional on no stopping.
Models of controlled Brownian motion would be a natural analytical framework for this.
Such an extension would be particularly valuable when extending the model to multi-
agent situations. While a multi-agent version of the R&D race with learning seems
relatively straightforward (since the game ends at the moment of first innovation), models
of informational externalities do not seem to fit the Poisson framework that well. In order
for our methods to work, beliefs must evolve smoothly over time. A model where the
beliefs are driven by controlled Brownian motions, observations on other players could
be smoothed by observational noise in such a way that the model is still applicable.
These models might lead to even higher current wage demands by the workers. Since the
value function is convex in beliefs, information flowing from the decisions of other players
tends to increase the continuation value to any player. Hence this would counteract the
controlled stopping effect and push the wage demands further up.
We leave the analysis of these extensions to future research.
Proof of lemma 1
To show the first part of the bound, note that from the Bellman equation (8) and max-
imisation,
δVD(pi) ≥ (1− F (w, pi))(w − VD(pi))−∆F (w)pi(1− pi)V
′
D
(pi)
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for any w ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, this inequality holds for w = wR(pi). Rearranging, this
gives
VD(pi) ≥
(1− F (wR(pi), pi))wR(pi)
1− F (wR(pi), pi) + δ
−
∆F (wR(pi))
1− F (wR(pi), pi) + δ
pi(1− pi)V ′D(pi)
= VR(pi)−
∆F (wR(pi))
1− F (wR(pi), pi) + δ
pi(1− pi)V ′
D
(pi).
The following lemma establishes that VD(pi) is convex.
Lemma 2 VD(pi) is convex in pi.
Proof. Consider two points, pi and pi′ and let piλ = λpi+ (1− λ)pi′. We want to show
that for all pi, pi′ and piλ, we have:
VD(pi
λ) ≤ λVD(pi) + (1− λ)VD(pi
′).
Denote by wλ the path of optimal actions starting from piλ. Denote by WH(w) the
expected payoff from an arbitrary path of prices w conditional on the true distribution
being H and similarly for WL(w). Then we have:
VD(pi
λ) = piλWH(wλ) + (1− piλ)WL(wλ).
We also know that
VD(pi) ≥ piW
H(wλ) + (1− pi)WL(wλ),
VD(pi
′) ≥ pi′WH(wλ) + (1− pi′)WL(wλ)
since wλ is a feasible price path.
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Hence
λVD(pi) + (1− λ)VD(pi
′) ≥ λ(piWH(wλ) + (1− pi)WL(wλ))
+ (1− λ)(pi′WH(aλ) + (1− pi′)WL(wλ))
= (λpi + (1− λ)pi′)WH(wλ) + (1− λpi − (1− λ)pi′)WL(wλ)
= piλWH(wλ) + (1− piλ)WL(wλ) = VD(pi
λ).
This proves the claim. 
Since VD(pi) is convex, V
′
D
(pi) ≤ (V (1)− VD(pi))/(1− pi) . Therefore
VD(pi) ≥ VR(pi)−
∆F (wR(pi))
1− F (wR(pi), pi) + δ
pi(V (1)− VD(pi)).
Note that ∆F (w)/(1− F (w, pi) + δ) is maximised at wˆ. Hence
VD(pi) ≥ VR(pi)−
∆F (wˆ)
1− F ((wˆ, pi) + δ
pi(V (1)− VD(pi)).
Rearranging this inequality, and using convexity again, means that
pi(1− pi)V ′
D
(pi) ≤ pi(V (1)− VD(pi)) ≤ pi
(
1− F (wˆ, pi) + δ
1− FL(wˆ) + δ
)
(V (1)− VR(pi)),
which completes the first part of the proof. For the second half of the bound, note that
maximisation implies that VD(pi) ≥ piV (1). Since this inequality holds with strict equality
at pi = 1, it implies that V ′
D
(pi) ≤ V (1). This completes the proof.
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